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SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN PUBLIC UTILITY LAW
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS

*

T

HE TERM public utilities will be used here in the generic
sense. The term is sometimes used in a specific sense to include such businesses as gas, electricity, telephone, telegraph,
etc. This was at first the sole way in which the term was used.
More recently the term has been extended to include all businesses
affected with a public interest, or those which are otherwise
designated as public callings. In this sense, the term will include
innkeepers, railways, and other common carriers of goods and of
passengers, public warehousemen, and the enterprises formerly
designated as public utilities.
However, this discussion will be confined to changes which
have affected the law of public utilities as a whole. It will not
include changes in the law of specific public utilities. Great
changes for example have been incorporated in the law as to the
liability of innkeepers and of common carriers with reference to
the safety of goods and to the termination of their common law
liability. Such changes as these will not come within the range of
our discussion which will be confined to more general tendencies.
The law of public utilities is not the only form of social control
which has been applied to the businesses which are classified as
public utilities. Besides the regulation of these businesses according to the law of public utilities, these businesses have also been
regulated (1) by laissez-faire, or self-regulation instead of social
control, (2) by the law of enforced competition, (3) by social
control like the public utility trust of Great Britain, and (4) by
government ownership and operation, or government ownership
with private operation under contract, as a substitute for private
ownership. Laissez-faire was the rule in the United States for
the most part prior to 1875. Enforced competition was chain* A. B., Yankton College (1897), A. M., Id. (1899), LL. D., Id. (1925),
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pioned by President Woodrow Wilson I and is the theory embodied
in the Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, and the
Sherman Anti-trust Act and other anti-trust acts, in so far as
they were made applicable to public utilities. The public utility
2
trust of Great Britain has never been tried in the United States.
Government ownership of utilities has never had much trial in
the United States until fairly recent times and even now it has
not been tried extensively on any large scale. The T. V. A. experiment is probably the most significant form of government ownership that we have had in the United States. However, in colonial
days there probably was not the antagonism to public ownership
which manifested itself in the 19th century.
The law of public utilities is of very early origin after the
Norman Conquest, but it has attained its greatest importance
only in relatively recent times. During all of its history, it has
been undergoing significant changes. In the strict period 12721613, the public utilities were common callings. These included
all trades and businesses, although at that time these were not
numerous.8 All of the trades were liable for negligent acts in
trade, 4 and bailees were liable as insurers for the safety of goods
1 WILSON, NEw FREEDOM (1913).
2

The essential characteristics of this form of social control are as follows:
1. Monopoly (in each industry).

2. Elimination of the profit motive.
3. The elimination of voting stockholders and the replacement of directors by government appointed trustees.
4. The payment of fixed interest from 3% to 5%, and the making of
stock not tax exempt.
5. The use of surplus and earnings to reduce charges or to reduce taxes
by turning them into the treasury of government.

6. The establishment of business principles.
7. The appointment of the trustees by the government on the basis of
public spirit and general ability rather than interest representation or party selection.
8. The placing of the business management in a general manager
appointed by the trustees with all salaries fixed by law.
*9. Making responsible for the scheme ex offlcio, the minister in charge
of that government department most closely related to the industry.

10. The requirement of treasury approval before the floatation of additional securities.
Revised from: Dimoclk, British and American Utilities (1933) 1 U. OF CHI.
L. Ruv. 265.
3 Adler, Business Jurisprudence (1914) 28 HARv. L. Rsv. 135, 152, 158.
4 Arterburn, Origin and First Test of Public Callings (1926) 75 U. or
PA. L. Rsv. 411, 419.
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in their possession.5 The only regular public utility duty which
rested upon the common callings in the strict period was the duty
to serve.6 In the period of equity, 1613-1793, the public utilities
did not include all businesses but only monopoly businesses. At
least this was true so far as Lord Hale had influence on this
part of the law.7 To the duty to serve there was added in this
period at least one other duty, the duty to serve for reasonable
compensation., In this period, the liability for the safety of goods
was also somewhat modified. In the period of maturity, 17931875, two new public utility duties were added: the duty to serve
with reasonably adequate facilities,' and the duty to serve without discrimination." Prior to this time, there was no liability
except under the law of negligence. But the most significant
development of the law of public utilities in the period of maturity
was the substitution of contract law for the law of public utilities.
In accordance with the goal of law in the period of maturity, the
parties were allowed to regulate their conduct for the most part
by private contracts. 1
With the period of socialization, 1875 to date, there came a revival of the law of public utilities. The courts, especially the United
States Supreme Court, began to put limitations upon freedom
of contract. 12 As a result of the Granger movement, there was
a revulsion against the supplanting of the law of public callings
by contract, and governmental regulation under the law of public
callings again came into vogue. 13 In the celebrated case of Munn
v. IllinoiS14 the United States Supreme Court gave a twist to the
5 Southcote's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 836 (1601); Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 190, 2
Lev. 69 (1671).
6 WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936)
7

760.

Hale, De Jure Maris, 1 HARGRAVE TRACTS 6; Hale, De Portibus Manis, 1

HARGRAvE TRACTS 78.
8

Allnut v. Inglis, 12 East 527 (K. B. 1810).
9 Bremner v. Williams, 1 C. & P. 414 (N. P. 1824); Shepard v. Milwaukee
Gas Light Company, 6 Wis. 539 (1858).
10 Scofield v. Railway Co., 43 Ohio St. 571 (1885).
"Judson v. Western R. R. Corp., 6 Allen 486 (Mass. 1863).

12 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873); Express Co. v.
Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264 (U. S. 1874).
13 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
24 The reestablishment of the law of public utilities involved a question
of due process. As to this point the Court based its decision on the fact
that this social control had been a part of English common law and that our
Constitution had been adopted in the light of this practice. It might have
held it due process of law because of the need for the protection of the social
interest both in the general economic progress and in the individual life.
The Court held that it was not a violation of the equality clause to make
this social control apply simply to businesses classed as public utilities

GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

law of ]public utilities as it had been announced by Lord Hale
with reference to wharves, so as to make it apply to every business
which might be classed as a public utility. This was a use of
Lord Hale's law which must have made him twist in his grave. 5
Since this time, though public utilities and their patrons have
been permitted to make contracts to govern their relations, social
control has very largely controlled the terms of those contracts
and has limited them by the law of public utilities as it has now
developed. In this period of socialization one new duty, that of
continuity, has apparently developed. 16
This paper will be concerned for the most part with those significant change in public utility law in the United States which
have occurred since 1875, or during the period of socialization.
TEST FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES

One significant change in public utility law which has occurred
since the decision of Munn v. IMinois has been the change in the
test for public utilities. The test adopted in this case was the
test of virtual monopoly, suggested by Lord Hale. The test as to
what businesses shall be and what shall not be classed as public
utilities is important because, if a business is classed as a public
utility, there is a large body of public utility law which applies
to it; if it is not a public utility, this body of law will not apply
to it, or at least it has not been applied to it until very recently.
When the Supreme Court, therefore, adopted the test of virtual
monopoly as the test for public utilities, it thereby subjected all
of the businesses which are virtual monopolies to the social control known as public utility law. The United States Supreme
Court decisions have been the most important in determining the
test for public utilities in the United States. State decisions have
not always agreed on the test of public utilities, but in the long
run, they have tended to follow the test adopted by the Supreme
Court. The Court seemed to put a limitation on the test of virtual
monopoly in the case of Budd v. New York.' 7 But, with this
because there was a sufficient reason for this classification in the fact that

businesses of this sort needed a social control which no other businesses
needed.
' McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 759.
16 Wilsonv. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917); Bullock v. Florida, 254 U. S. 513
(1921); Wolff Packing Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S.
522 (1923); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Alabama Public Service Comm.,
279 U. S.560 (1929).
17 143 U. S. 517 (1892).
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exception, the test of virtual monopoly continued to be the test
until the decision of Brass v. North Dakota.'s
The Supreme Court in the last case seemed almost to abandon
the test of virtual monopoly and to permit a legislative declaration to make any business a public utility. In German Alliance
Insurance Co. v. Lewis 19 the Supreme Court adopted a test which
was two-fold in nature, virtual monopoly and indispensable
service, a test which had been suggested in the case of Budd v.
New York; but the Court did not directly overrule the case of
Brass v. North Dakota. However in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court
of IndustrialRelations 20 the Supreme Court directly overruled
Brass v. North Dakota, held that a business could not be made a
public utility by legislative declaration, and adopted a three fold
test for public utilities: (1) a grant of privilege, (2) historical
survival, and (3) virtual monopoly and indispensable service.
The third part of the test is the one which had been emerging in
the prior cases and is the only one of importance so far as new
businesses are concerned and perhaps it is sufficient to take care
of the classes for which the court suggested the first two parts
of the test. This test has been consistently applied in cases decided
21
since the Wolff Packing Company Case.
In spite of the fact that since the decision of Munn v. Illinois
the test of a public utility has been made narrower, the number
of public utilities has been made larger; and, therefore, the scope
of the law of public utilities has been made broader. This, perhaps, has been due to the fact that businesses have changed, so
that there are more virtual monopolies now than formerly; and
economic and social conditions have changed, so that there are
more indispensable services now than there were at one time.
All along through the years, more and more businesses have been
Is153 U. S.391 (1894).
19 233 U. S.389 (1914). Followed by Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S.135 (1921).
20 262 U. S.522, 538 (1923). The language of the Court was, ". . . the
indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant charge and arbitrary
control to which the public might be subjected without regulation [because

of ' monopoly']."
21 Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S.418 (1927)
(theaters, not an indispensable
service); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928) (employment agencies,
not an indispensable service); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S.235
(1929) (selling gasoline, not a monopoly); Tagg Brothers '. United States,
280 U. S.420 (1930) (commission men, both indispensable service and virtual
monopoly); O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S.251
(1931) (insurance, a public utility); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U. S. 262 (1932) (manufacturing and selling ice, not an indispensable

service).
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put into the class of public utilities and there are now new businesses which would undoubtedly be so classified under the test as
it now stands if the question was presented to the United States
Supreme Court. Among such businesses might be named aviation,
22
radio and holding companies of public utilities.
PUBLIC UTILITY DUTIES
Another significant change in public utility law during the
period of socialization has been the growth of public utility duties
and changes in old public utility duties. Most of the growth in
this part of public utility law occurred before the period of socialization and we have already referred to that. We have also called
attention to the fact that the duty of continuity is a new duty
which has arisen in the period of socialization. 23 Changes in the
duty to serve all, the duty to serve with reasonably adequate
facilities, the duty to serve without discrimination and the duty
to serve for reasonable compensation have occurred as the Court
has applied this law to new and ever changing conditions.
For example the duty to furnish reasonably adequate facilities
now requires railways to equip their cars with vestibule doors
although at one time this could not have been required. 24 In the
same way, railways may now be required to equip their trains
with power brakes, 25 to build union stations, 26 and to furnish seats
22

WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 765. For general discussions of
the test of public callings see: FREUND, POLICE POWER, 23, 388: WYMAN,
PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS § 156. Boudin, Is Economic Planning Constitutional? (1933) GEORGETOWN. LAW JOURNAL 253, 387; Adler, Business
Jurisprudence (1914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 135, 152; Arterburn, Origin and
First Test of Public Callings (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 411, 419; Berman,
Present Status of the Kansas System of Compulsory Arbitration (1928) 23
ILL. L. REV. 30; Burdick, Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service
Companies (1911) 11 COL. L. REv. 514, 522; Hardman, Public Utilities
(1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 250; Robinson,. The Public Utility: A Problem in
Social Engineering (1928) 14 CORN. L. Q. 1; Robinson, Public Utility Concept (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 277; Simpson, Due Process and Coal Price
Regulation (1924) 9 IOWA L. BULL. 145; Willis, When Is a Business Affected
with a Public Interest? (1928) 3 IND. L. J. 384. Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 803, 15 U. S. C. A. § 879 (Supp. 1936).

22 This is not an absolute duty, but public utilities (at least most of them)
cannot discontinue their systems without first obtaining either commission
consent or a judicial determination of fact that an entire system can
operate only at a loss. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm., 251 U. S. 396
(1920); Bullock v. Florida, 254 U. S. 513 (1921); Ft. Smith Light and
Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267 U. S. 330 (1925).
t
10 C. J. 961.
25 Fairport Painesville & Eastern R. R. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589 (1934).

24

26 Atchison T. & S. F. R. R. v. Railroad Comm., 283 U. S. 380 (1931).
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to passengers.27 Telephone companies also may be required to
furnish physical connections. 2 The duty to serve without discrimination has been limited in application until now segregation

of the races is permitted either in inns or on railways. 2 Even
the oldest duty to serve all has been explained and qualified so
as to exclude from it persons fleeing from justice, afflicted with
contagious diseases, planning to gamble on trains or otherwise
to endanger the comfort and safety of passengers. 30
The changes in the duty to serve for reasonable compensation
have recently been so great that they are entitled to a little more
detailed consideration. In order to determine when a public utility
is receiving reasonable compensation some basis for such determination must be adopted. Any basis would involve both a rate base
(valuation) and a rate of return. The decisions of the United
States Supreme Court on these subjects have neither been consistent nor clarifying, but they have worked significant changes
in the application of the law of public utilities.
BASE RATE
The rate base for the determination of reasonable compensation for public utilities might be determined in any one of a
number of different ways which have been suggested. One such
way would be original capitalization. This way has been definitely
rejected because of the watering of stock in the past. Another
way would be by the value assessed for taxation. But the purpose
here is so different that this method has not received much
cohsideration. The first method adopted by the Supreme Court
for determining the rate base was that of fair value. This was
the rate base adopted in the case of Smyth v. Ames. 31 In this rate
base, consideration is given to a congeries of diverse and mutually
exclusive elements, such as original cost, amount of permanent
improvements, value of bonds and stocks, present cost, earning
capacity and operating expenses. To attempt to determine a rate
base in this way is to attempt the impossible. Justice Brandeis, in
his dissent, has conclusively pointed out that "Obviously 'value'
Camden & Atlantic R. R.v. Hoosey, 99 Pa. 492 (1882).
M cCardle v. Akron Telephone Co., 87 Ind. App. 59, 160 N. E. 48 (1928).
29 BEALE, INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS § 55; Chicago & N. W. Ry.v. Williams,
55 Ill. 185 (1870).
3o Thurston v. Union Pacific R. R., 23 Fed. Cas. No. 14,019 (C. C. D. Neb.
1877).
3L 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
27

2 8
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cannot be a composite of all of these elements." 32 Yet in spite of
this fact, the Supreme Court has continued to adhere to fair value
as its rate base for determining reasonable compensation.
In the case of McCardle v. IndianapolisWater Company3 4 the
Court adopted reproduction cost as the rate base for determining
reasonable compensation. The cases following Smyth v. Ames
had been giving increasing weight to the importance of reproduction cost and finally in the McCardle Case this was adopted as
the sole element to be considered. But in the St. Louis & O'Fallon
Railway Case 35 the Court evidently came to the conclusion that
it had gone too far in the McCardle Case, and, not knowing what
else to do, fell back again on the amorphous fair value rate base
of Smytk v. Ames. Yet the Court still continues to give chief
emphasis to reproduction cost and in the case of United Railways
and Electric Company v. West 3 6 held that since the rate base
requires figuring according to present value, depreciation must
be figured in the same way. Reproduction cost as a rate base is
likely to be unfair because too large after a period of inflation
and too small after a. period of deflation; and uncertain because
it depends, for the most part, on imaginative guessing by engineers. For this reason another rate base called prudent investment, which is the original cost corrected so as to eliminate any
elements which are not just and fair, has been suggested as the
best rate base for the determination of reasonable compensation.
This was set forth by Justice Brandeis in a dissenting opinion in
Missouri v. Public Service Commission3 7 and has been followed
by some state courts. But the Supreme Court has not as yet
adopted it though it is taking a more realistic approach towards
the subject.3 The Supreme Court evidently has not as yet decided
upon any final rate base, but it cannot forever wallow in the
uncertainties of the rate base announced in Smyth v. Ames-"
32 Missouri ,v.
Public Service Comm. (Southwestern Bell Case) 262 U. S.
276,295 (1923).

33 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913); Southwestern Bell Case,
262 U. S.276 (1923); Georgia Ry; & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm., 262 U. S.
625 (1923); Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service

Comm., 262 U. S. 679 (1923).
34272 U. S. 400 (1926).

St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461 (1929).
8280 U. S. 234 (1930); Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad
Comm., 289 U. S.287 (1933).
3T262 U. S.276, 289 (1923).
38 Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934); Dayton
Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 292 U. S.290 (1934).
35

39 Dorety, Functioning of Reproduction Cost in Public Utilities and Rate
Making Valuation (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 173; Edgerton, Value of the
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THE RATE OF RETURN

At first the United States Supreme Court was inclined to allow
about six per cent as the rate of return.40 Later it held that six
per cent was too low a rate of return. 41 Finally it allowed a rate
of return as high as eight per cent when over two-thirds of the
money invested in the business was borrowed money, borrowed
at a rate much lower than this. 42 In Los Angeles Gas and Electric
Corp. v. Railroad Commission4 3 a rate of seven per cent was
allowed.
The duty to serve for reasonable compensation which rests upon
public utilities is supposed to limit the amount of their profits to
less rather than to increase their profits to more than other
businesses obtain. Yet the rate of return guaranteed to public
utilities by the United States Supreme Court has probably given
these businesses affected with a public interest a right to more
profits than other businesses, on the average, have been able to
obtain. The Supreme Court has said that public utilities are
entitled to the same sort of return that is obtained where money
is invested in other equally secure enterprises. The United States
government has been able to sell its tax exempt securities for
from two to four per cent interest. Insurance companies and
savings banks have allowed a lower rate of interest than this on
money invested with them. Large corporations, both public
utilities and those not public utilities, have been able to sell their
bonds not tax exempt for an interest rate of four per cent to
Service as a Factorin Rate-Making (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 516; Goddard,
Public Utility Valuation (1917) 15 MIcH. L. REv. 206; Guernsey, Value in
Confiscation Cases (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 575; Hale, The "Physical
Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 710; Hardman, Recent
Developments in Regardto Rate Regulation (1923) 30 W. VA. L. Q. 70; Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts (1920) 33 HAv.L.Rv.902, 1031;
Howell, Recent Developments in the Application of the Rule of Smyth v.
Ames (1925) 3 TEx. L. REV. 412, Richberg, The Supreme Court Discusses
Value (1924) 37 HAnv. L. R.v. 289; Richberg, A Permanent Basis for Rate
Regulation (1922) 31 YALE L. J.263; Robinson, Duty of a Public Utility to
Serve at Reasonable Rates: The "Valuation" War (1926) 6 N. C. L. REV.
243; Whitten, Fair Value for Rate Purposes (1914) 27 HARv. L. REV. 419;
Notes (1927) 3 IND. L. J. 225; (1925) 24 MIcH. L. REv. 166.
40 Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Company, 212 U. S.19 (1909); Des Moines
Gas
Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S.153 (1915).
4
" Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
262 U. S.679 (1923); of. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263
U. S.456 (1924).
42 United Railways and Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S.234
(1930).
43 289 U. S. 287 (1933).
3
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five per cent and their preferred stock for six per cent. Public
utilities are some of the biggest and safest businesses in the
United States and they would have been even safer if they had
not been allowed as high a rate as has been guaranteed them.
The Court has evidently allowed increasingly too high a rate of
return.
The result on the one hand of such a high rate of return as the
Supreme Court has allowed has been to prevent the economic
development both of the public utilities and of the country as a
whole. High freight and passenger rates for the railroads, instead of making them prosperous, were tending to injure them,
because with such high rates they could not meet other competition. It was only when the Interstate Commerce Commission
forced lower rates upon the railroads that they began to make
more money. High rates in the same way hindered development
of electric companies. The companies which made the greatest
profits during the year 1936 were those which had been forced
to cut their rates by the T V. A. The worst effect of these high
rates has, however, been the retarding of the economic development of the country as a whole. The'high electric rates were
robbing our country of cheap electricity. No one can estimate the
loss to our country as a whole in not having cheap electricity.
The result on the other hand of this high rate of return has
been the encouragement of an orgy of high finance which has
been bad both for the public utilities and for the public as a whole.
The Supreme Court has allowed a rate of return higher than the
dividends which public utilities have had to pay on preferred
stock and the interest which they have had to pay on bonds. In
order to absorb this difference and to cover up this fact, public
utility magnates have organized holding companies to own the
common stock of the operating companies and they have financed
the holding companies in the same way that the operating companies had been financed by selling bonds and preferred stock for
less than the rate of return guaranteed public utilities by the
Supreme Court. Then one holding company has been pyramided
upon another. - In this way a few insiders have been obtaining
returns running all the way from twenty per cent to one thousand
per cent.44 This was bad enough, but they were not content merely
to exploit the situation created by the United States Supreme
Court. They were so anxious to indulge in high finance that they
indulged in such sorts of scandals, corruptions and wild-cat
44WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1936)

775, 782.

Rates and Modern Finance (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 151.

Cohen, Confiscatory
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speculations that very frequently they not only lost the exorbitant
profits they might otherwise have obtained but they brought their
businesses down in ruins upon their heads.
So far as concerns the duty of public utilities to serve for
reasonable compensation, therefore, the law of public utilities, or
governmental regulation has not been a success. So far as concerns the other public utility duties, probably the law of public
utilities has on the whole been fairly successful. But the failure
of public utility law in the matter of reasonable compensation
has been so great that it is a question of whether all the law of
public utilities should not be abandoned and some other scheme
of social control tried in its stead. The reason for this failure
has been three fold. First, it has been due to the attitude of
public utilities who have fought governmental regulation and
have tried to make it ineffective. Second, it has been due to the
administration of the law by state public service commissions
who have sometimes been subject to corruption by public utilities,
and frequently filled by men who lack qualifications for their task.
Third, it has been due to the unfortunate decisions of the United
States Supreme Court on the rate base and the rate of return for
the determination of reasonable compensation. These decisions
have probably been responsible more than any other cause for
the failure of governmental regulation of public utilities.
More recently a slight attempt on the part of the federal
government has been made to correct the evils of public utility
holding companies. The United States Supreme Court has taken
the position that in determining the reasonableness of the income
allowed to an operating company, the amount paid by an operating company to a holding company may be investigated. 45 Congress also has passed a public utility holding company act which
puts important limitations upon such interstate holding companies. 46 While it does not abolish holding companies in the
public utility field, it requires registration for interstate commerce
and for use of the United States mails, makes it unlawful even
for registered companies to issue or sell securities from houseto-house without a declaration filed and forbids the acquirement
of other securities without consent of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, simplifies the holding company systems so as to
eliminate pyramiding, forbids service, sales and construction con45 Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930); Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Kansas, 285 U. S. 119 (1932).
40 Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 803, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79
(Supp. 1936); Notes, (1936) 16 B. U. L. Rnv. 178; (1936) 4 GEo. WASH. L.
fRv. 532; (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 468.
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tracts for operating companies and makes profits acquired by
officers inure to holding companies. This act raises some important constitutional questions. One is a question of violation
of our dual form of government, but probably the act can be
upheld here under the commerce power and the postal power.
Another is a question of delegation of legislative power, but
probably sufficient standards for the Security and Exchange
Commission have been set up to meet this point. A third constitutional question involves due process, but it would seem that
there is a sufficient social interest to be protected to make the act
constitutional so far as concerns this point, either under the police
power or under the regulation of public utilities. If the act is
constitutional, it will contribute in no small measure to the elimination of some of the evils which have grown up in this particular
field of governmental regulation.
However, the regulation of holding companies will not solve
the main problem of governmental regulation of public utilities.
That problem can only be solved by a change in the law as to the
rate base and as to the rate of return. A change in the law as
to the rate of return is perhaps the most important thing. It
would seem to the writer that an experimental rate of return of
four per cent would come as near to being the correct rate as
any that might be suggested. This rate is as high as the rates of
return which can be found in other comparable investments, and
under the public utility trust of Great Britain. It is believed that
if a rate no higher than this was allowed, there would be no difficulty in public utilities obtaining all the money which they need
for their enterprises. When they are able to sell their bonds for
from four per cent to five per cent interest it seems very singular
that the companies should be guaranteed a higher rate of return
than they have to pay when they borrow money. If this rate of
return was all that was allowed, it would automatically eliminate
holding companies and most of the other evils of high finance
which have crept into the public utility business, but the reform
waits upon the Supreme Court. Until the Supreme Court reverses
its decisions on this point, it would seem no effective solution of
many public utility problems is possible.
PUBLIC COUNSELLOR
A development in public utility law of some significance is the
creation of the office of public counsellor. Many states have now
created this office. The reason for the creation of public counsellors has been the failure on the part of public service commissions
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to aid the legislatures in the development of policies and to apply
administrative control to public utilities, and their attempt to act
more or less as courts in deciding conflicting claims according to
law. In the beginning it was assumed that the courts were adequate to protect the public utilities and that public service commissions had, as their function, the protection of the public. Yet
more and more they have tended to become quasi-judicial bodies.
This has been due partly to the personnel of the commissions
(generally lawyers familiar with regular legal procedure) and to
the attitude of the courts in commission cases. 4 7 The office of
the public in
public counsellor has been established to represent
48
litigation before public service commissions.
EXTENSION OF PUBLIC UTILITY LAW TO OTHER BUSINESSES

A most significant recent development of public utility law has
been the extension of this law so far as it concerns the regulation
of prices to other businesses than public utilities. In the case of
Stephenson v. Binford,49 the Supreme Court upheld the regulation
of the charges of contract carriers. This seemed to be an extension of public utility law to other businesses rather than an
enlargement of the number of public utility businesses but if
there was any doubt on the subject, this was removed by two
other cases. In O'Gorman & Young v. HartfordFire Ins. Co., 50
the Supreme Court permitted the regulation of the charges of
insurance brokers. This, of course, was a price regulation of a
public utility business but in the prior case of Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas,51 the Supreme Court
had held that it would not allow the fixing of wages of employees
even if they were working for public utilities. In the case of
Nebbia v. New York,5 2 - the Supreme Court definitely applied a
public utility duty to a business which was not a public utility.
In the Nebbia. Case the Supreme Court held that the prices in a
milk business could be regulated even though the business did
not have a virtual monopoly so that it could be declared a public
utility. In the prior case of Williams v. Standard Oil Co.,53 the
Supreme Court had held that price fixing was illegal outside of
47
48
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49 287 U. S. 251 (1932).
59 282 U. S. 251 (1931).

51262 U. S. 522 (1923).
52 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
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public utilities. This shows the significance of the change in the
law of governmental regulation. The Nebbia Case, if taken at its
face value, not only broke the United States taboo against price
fixing, but opened the door to the extension of the social control,
known as the law of public utilities, to all businesses and not
simply to those which have a virtual monopoly and are rendering
an indispensable service. Of course, as yet the Supreme Court
has only extended the duty to serve for reasonable compensation
to these other businesses, but it would not be surprising if, in
the course of time, it extended all other of the duties. Civil rights
statutes, as a matter of fact, have already required to serve without discrimination, businesses which are not public utilities such
as barbers,64 restaurants, 55 theaters,56 and dance halls.5 7 And these
statutes have been upheld as proper exercises of the police power.
The Supreme Court now seems inclined to take the position that
the term "affected with a public interest means no more than
that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for
the public good."
Stimulated by this development in the law, Congress has passed
the Robinson-Patman Act 51 forbidding price discrimination between competing purchasers of goods of like grade and quality,
if the goods are articles of interstate commerce, for use in the
United States, and the discrimination tends to lessen competition
and so create a monopoly. The wisdom of this legislation may
be a matter of doubt but there is no doubt that Congress is undertaking to take advantage of the Nebbia Case to regulate prices
outside of public utilities. It is founded on the Nebbia Case.
It is an attempt to apply generally public utility law as to
discrimination.
The administration of the Robinson-Patman Act has been committed to the Federal Trade Commission. The act does not forbid
discrimination where there is a difference in cost of manufacture,
sale or delivery. Prices may also change with the market. It
does not forbid people to choose their own customers. But proof
of discrimination creates a prima facie case and the Federal
Trade Commission is authorized to issue a cease and desist order
54
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Ferguson. v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N. W. 718 (1890).
56 Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N. E. 667 (1926); Joyner v. MooreWiggins Co., 152 App. Div. 266, 269, 136 N. Y. Supp. 578 (4th Dep't 1912).

57 Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Elec. R. R., 222 N. Y. 443, 119 N. E. 72
(1918).
5849 STAT. 1526, 15 U. S. C. A. § 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (Supp. 1936); Notes,
(1936) 50 HARv. L. REv. 106; (1936) 70 U. S. L. REv. 620.
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unless the accused shows justification. Brokerage commissions
are not permitted as discounts. Advertising allowances are prohibited unless competitors use them. Discrimination between purchasers for resale is prohibited. It is made unlawful knowingly
to induce or receive a discrimination in price. It relies upon the
previous enforcement provisions of the Clayton Act but adds
new criminal provisions and protects cooperative associations.
This act raises some difficult constitutional questions. Perhaps
the Nebbia Case covers the extension of the law as to discrimination to fields outside of public utilities, though it probably is not
safe to generalize much from the Nebbia Case; 59 but there are
other constitutional questions. Probably the act as a whole could
be upheld as constitutional if the Supreme Court will take the
position that the prohibitions are not absolute. For the Federal
Government to have the power indicated, it must be found in
the commerce clause. The act is not expressly so limited but the
Court could undoubtedly confine it to interstate commerce. So far
as concerns due process, the Court could probably find a sufficient
social interest for this regulation as much as it can for the regulation of public utilities, except for the prima facie rule. The
Supreme Court has held that it is a denial of due process of law
to make conclusive presumptions as to substantive consequences."
To uphold the act, it will have tQ hold that there is both a rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of the latter fact is reasonable.
The act seems to be aimed at chain stores. Whether or not it is
a violation of the equality clause for this reason will depend upon
whether or not the Supreme Court thinks the protection of
independent wholesalers and retailers is sufficient reason for the
classification.
JUDICIAL REVIEW

A still further significant change in public utility law concerns
judicial view. In the case of Munn v. Illinois 61 the Supreme
Court took the position that rate regulation was a legislative
matter not subject to judicial view. But after the eighties, when
due process was extended to matters of substance, the Court
took the position that a due process question is involved in rate
making and that if rates are too low, i. e., confiscatory, public
utilities are deprived of their property without due process of
59 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distributing Corp., 299 U. S.
183, 190, 191 (1936).
60 Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1. (1929).
6194 U.S. 113 (1876).
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law.62 Of course, this made the question a judicial question and
made the judicial power extend thereto6 s This jurisdiction might
have been limited to questions of law. The Supreme Court, however, in administrative cases extended judicial review not only
to matters of fact 64 but to a trial de novo; 15 and held that if a
court acts as an administrative agency, a judicial review by
another court is necessary to satisfy the requirements of the
law.66 Recently the Court has begun to show more respect for
commission findings of fact.6 7 But it is doubtful if a satisfactory
result can ever be obtained without abolishing judicial review in
the case of due process as to matters of substance. Since there
is no hope of this change coming to pass even by a change in the
personnel of the Court, there seems necessary an amendment to
the Constitution providing that the judicial power of the Courts
of the United States shall not extend to due process as a matter
of substance. Even then the judicial power would continue to
extend to due process as a matter of procedure and would limit
the methods of commissions.
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP

Government ownership is still another significant change or
development in the field of public utilities. It is not a change in
public utility law. It is a change in the solution of the problem
of rendering indispensable social services where there is a situation of virtual monopoly. When government ownership comes
in, private ownership and operation under the law of public
utilities is likely to go out. There has been considerable development in the United States as well as in foreign countries in
government ownership and operation of many social services.
The T. V. A. experiment is one of the latest and perhaps one of
the most successful of these experiments in the United States.
Whether this is to develop into a scheme of government ownership and operation of important electrical services or whether it
is to remain merely a yardstick for determining what is reasonable compensation for public utilities remains as yet an open
62 Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890); Reagan
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64 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
65 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 60 (1932).
66 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908).
57 Interstate Commerce Comm. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 287 U. S.
178 (1932) ; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1 (1934) ; American T. & T.
Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232 (1936).
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question. It, of course, is an attempt, so far as it is a yardstick,
to accomplish indirectly what cannot be accomplished directly
because of the barrier of United States Supreme Court decisions.
It now seems as though some other changes in public utility
law must be made which will perhaps be more significant than
any that have occurred in the last fifty or sixty years. Governmental regulation under the law of public utilities has not been
a success for the reasons which we have already set forth. Something must be done about this. It is impossible to go back to a
reign of laissez-faire. It is impossible to enforce competition. It
probably would be impossible to introduce into the United States
the public utility trust of Great Britain despite its many fine
features. Government ownership and operation would probably
solve the problem and accomplish the results desired; but in the
United States, there is a great deal of prejudice against a general
scheme of government ownership, in spite of the fact that we
already have government ownership of about one-tenth of the
business enterprises of the country. There remains, therefore,
only private ownership and operation of public utilities under
governmental regulation. Since the latter is not working satisfactorily, it cannot be continued longer without reformation. If
the right reforms were instituted, this might become both an
effective and fair scheme of social control. Apparently the only
constitutional way to affect these reforms is by a reversal of its
decisions on the rate of return and rate base by the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court recently has shown that it
is coming closer to economic realities, 8 but it has not as yet
given much ground for optimism on this point. However, if the
reforms suggested were brought to pass, it would make the law
of public utilities both a good scheme of social control for the
field of public utilities and a good scheme of social control to
incorporate into the general body of police power law, if it should
seem wise to extend the scope of public utility law to all businesses.
08
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